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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
In this consolidated appeal, Christopher Lee Lay appeals from the 
judgments entered upon the jury verdicts finding him guilty of attempted 
strangulation, misdemeanor domestic battery in the presence of children, a 
persistent violator enhancement, and intimidating a witness. For the first time on 
appeal, Lay claims a due process violation in relation to the persistent violator 
enhancement. Lay also asserts the district court abused its discretion by failing 
to place him on probation. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2011-0017463 ("Case No. 2011-17463"), 
the state charged Lay with attempted strangulation and misdemeanor domestic 
battery in the presence of children for acts he committed against his girlfriend, 
Jamie. (R., pp.10-12, 37-38.) In that same case, the state filed an Information 
Part II alleging Lay is a persistent violator. (R., pp.45-46.) 
Two months later, in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2011-0019826 ("Case 
No. 2011-19826"), the state charged Lay with intimidating a witness, but did not 
allege a persistent violator enhancement in that case. (R., pp.221-222, 239-
240.) The state filed a motion to consolidate both cases, which the court 
granted. (R., pp.234-236.) 
A jury found Lay guilty of both charges alleged in Case No. 2011-17463 
and of the intimidating a witness charge in Case No. 2011-19826. (R., pp.189-
191, 375.) The jury also found Lay is a persistent violator. (R., p.376.) 
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In Case No. 2011-17463, the court imposed a unified 15-year sentence 
with five years fixed for attempted strangulation and a concurrent 90-day 
sentence for the misdemeanor charge, with 90 days credit for time served. (R., 
pp.203-206.) The court imposed a consecutive indeterminate five-year sentence 
in Case No. 2011-19826. (R., pp.388-391.) Lay filed timely notices of appeal in 
both cases, which were consolidated by order of the Idaho Supreme Court. (R., 
pp.2-3, 211-214, 394-396.) 
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ISSUES 
Lay states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was Mr. Lay's due process right to notice violated when he 
as found to be a persistent violator with respect to the 
intimidating a witness conviction when the State provided no 
notice of its intent to seek such an enhancement and the 
jury's verdict did not include a finding that he was a 
persistent violator as to the intimidating a witness 
conviction? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it declined to 
place Mr. Lay on probation following his convictions for 
attempted strangulation and intimidating a witness? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Lay failed to show reversible error in relation to the persistent violator 
enhancement? 
2. Has Lay failed to show the district court abused its discretion in denying 
his request for probation given the nature of the offenses and his criminal 
history, including his prior failures on probation and parole? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Lay Has Failed To Show Reversible Error In Relation To The Persistent Violator 
Enhancement 
Although the state did not allege the persistent violator enhancement in 
the intimidating a witness case, Case No. 2011-19826, the verdict form for the 
persistent violator enhancement included both Case No. 2011-19826 and Case 
No. 2011-17463, the case in which the enhancement was alleged. (R., p.376.) 
Lay expressly stated he had no objection to the verdict form. (Tr. 1, p.354, Ls.3-4, 
6.) The verdict form reflects the jury's finding that Lay is a persistent violator. 
(R., p.354.) 
At the outset of sentencing, the court noted: 
Mr. Lay was found guilty as a persistent violator in the 2011 case 
ending 17 463 of attempted strangulation and domestic battery in 
the presence of child [sic] as a misdemeanor. Likewise he was 
found guilty in the case - 2011 case ending 19826 of intimidating, 
impeding, influencing or preventing the attendance of a witness. 
(Tr., p.377, Ls.5-12.) 
Later, in imposing sentence, the court stated: 
So what I'm going to do in the 2011 case ending in 17463, 
on Count One, the attempted strangulation, I hereby sentence you 
to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections under the 
Unified Sentence Law of the [SJtate of Idaho for an aggregate of 15 
years with five fixed followed by ten indeterminate. 
On Count Two, the misdemeanor, I sentence you to three 
months. You'll get credit for all time served. It will be concurrent. 
In the case ending -- it's a 2011 case ending 19826, 
intimidation of a witness, I hereby sentence you to the custody of 
1 There are three transcripts included in the record on appeal. The transcript 
referred to in this brief contains the jury trial and sentencing hearing. 
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the Idaho State Board of Corrections under the Unified Sentence 
Law of the State of Idaho for an aggregate term of five years. And 
all of this, by the way, is enhanced as a persistent violator. Five 
years with zero fixed followed by five indeterminate. That case will 
run consecutive. 
(Tr., p.399, L.17-p.400, L.10.) 
Lay did not object to the manner in which the court imposed his sentence. 
(See generally Tr., pp.400-402.) The court entered a separate judgment in both 
cases and both judgments indicate the jury found Lay guilty of the persistent 
violator enhancement. (R., pp.203, 388.) Lay has taken no action in the district 
court to amend the language of the judgment in Case No. 2011-19826. 
For the first time on appeal, Lay complains "the parties and the district 
court erroneously believed that [he] had been found to be a persistent violator as 
to the intimidating a witness conviction" even though the enhancement was 
never alleged in that case. (Appellant's Brief, p.4.) Lay argues his "due process 
right to notice" was violated as a result. (Appellant's Brief, p.4.) Lay further 
contends that although "the sentence imposed did not exceed the non-enhanced 
maximum sentence for intimidating a witness, it is impossible to say from the 
record that the erroneous persistent violator finding was harmless." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.5.) Lay is incorrect. 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for 
appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an 
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
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209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). Review under the fundamental error 
doctrine requires Lay to demonstrate the error he alleges: "(1) violates one or 
more of [his] unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need 
for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) 
was not harmless." Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
The state concedes the persistent violator enhancement was not alleged 
in the Information filed in Case No. 2011-19826. Nevertheless, the verdict form 
for the enhancement included that case number, and was submitted to the jury 
without objection. While this was technically incorrect, Lay's claim that he was 
deprived of notice that the state was seeking to "enhance" the intimidating a 
witness charge seems somewhat disingenuous given that the cases were 
consolidated prior to trial and he was well-aware that the enhancement would be 
submitted to the jury along with all the substantive charges in both cases. After 
all, the purpose of providing notice is to afford a defendant an opportunity to 
know what he is being charged with so he can defend against it and protect 
himself against future prosecutions for the same offense. See State v. Owen, 
129 Idaho 920, 926, 935 P.2d 183, 189 (Ct. App. 1997). Lay cannot seriously 
contend he was deprived of notice in that sense. 
In any event, Lay has failed to demonstrate any error in relation to the 
persistent violator enhancement is anything but harmless in this case. In support 
of his argument that the error is not harmless, Lay relies on State v. Clark, 132 
6 
Idaho 337, 971 P.2d 1161 (Ct. App. 1998). (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Clark 
actually supports a contrary conclusion. 
In Clark, the state charged the defendant with two counts of lewd conduct 
and with being a persistent violator. 132 Idaho at 338, 971 P.2d at 1162. A jury 
found him guilty of both counts of lewd conduct and he moved to dismiss the 
enhancement, claiming the evidence was insufficient. kl The district court 
denied the motion and, after the jury found Clark was a persistent violator, the 
court imposed two concurrent unified life sentences with 30 years fixed. kl On 
appeal, the Court concluded "the district court erred when it submitted the 
persistent violator issue to the jury." kl at 340, 971 P.2d at 1164. Addressing 
the state's argument that the error was harmless because it "did not affect the 
district court's sentence," the Court stated: 
The issue before us then is whether we are convinced, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the persistent violator finding did 
not affect the sentence imposed by the district court. We recognize 
that the legislature created the persistent violator statute to insure 
that habitual criminals will serve longer periods of incarceration 
than first-time felons. The persistent violator status carries with it a 
certain stigma and may place pressure on the sentencing court to 
protect the public with a more lengthy sentence, as well as on 
prison officials who may be reluctant to grant parole. Therefore, a 
persistent violator finding will often cause enhancement of the 
sentence imposed by the sentencing court and may also defer 
one's parole status. 
Clark, 132 Idaho at 340, 971 P.2d at 1164. 
The Court ultimately concluded the error was not harmless, reasoning: 
In this case, Clark was found to be a persistent violator and 
was sentenced to prison for a long term, perhaps a term that will 
exceed the duration of his life. Although the district court listed the 
persistent violator finding separately in Clark's judgment of 
conviction, it did not make a separate reference to the persistent 
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violator finding when it defined the sentence. Also, a review of the 
transcript reveals that the record is silent as to how the persistent 
violator finding was taken into account by the district court in 
constructing the sentence. Based on the underlying policies of the 
persistent violator legislation, the district court's silence as to what 
weight, if any, it gave the persistent violator finding, and the facts of 
this particular case, we are not convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the district court would have sentenced Clark to thirty 
years fixed if he had not been found to be a persistent violator. 
Clark, 132 Idaho at 340-341, 971 P.2d at 1164-1165. 
Unlike in Clark, there was a valid persistent violator finding in this case, 
which the district court correctly noted at the outset of sentencing was part of 
"the 2011 case ending 17463." (Tr., p.377, Ls.5-6.) Further, because the cases 
were consolidated, the court imposed sentence on all charges at the same time, 
properly taking into account the enhancement in doing so. While the court 
commented that its sentence was "enhanced" because of the persistent violator 
finding, and both judgments reflect the enhancement, both felony sentences are 
within the statutory maximum and nowhere near the potential life sentence 
available as a result of the enhancement. It is difficult to conceive, under these 
circumstances, that the sentences would have been different but for the error in 
the verdict form, which carried through to the judgments. Lay has failed to meet 
his burden of demonstrating that any error related to the persistent violator 
enhancement affected the outcome of his case, i.e., his sentence. Perry, 150 
Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Any error is therefore harmless. 
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11. 
Lay Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Lay contends the district court "abused its discretion when it declined to 
place him on probation." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) A review of the applicable 
sentencing standards to the facts of this case shows Lay has failed to meet his 
burden of showing the district court abused its sentencing discretion. 
B. Standards Of Review 
"Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the 
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of 
discretion." State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) 
(quotations and citations omitted). "In deference to the trial judge, this Court will 
not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might 
differ." 19..,_ 
C. Lay Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Denying His Request For Probation 
Lay contends the district court abused its discretion in declining to place 
him on probation, claiming the "mitigating factors present in his case, most 
notably the express wishes of the victim," warranted granting his probation 
request. (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
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Prior to imposing sentence, the district court stated it considered the facts 
of Lay's crimes, his criminal history, and "all the Toohill[2l factors." (Tr., p.395, 
Ls.17-19.) The court then explained: 
I'm not going to lay out all of the things that both counsel 
have laid out, but I do want to make it clear the evidence in this 
case in my view was overwhelming that, in fact, you did these 
crimes contrary to what you say. The pictures of [the victim], the 
immediate statements that were made by her and her daughter are 
at complete odds with what you now claim and what she now claim 
[sic]. In fact, she's gone through several versions. That's not 
unusual in a domestic violence situation. It's very common that 
women and men who have been abused will change their versions 
and usually end up trying to support the person who's been 
accused. That happens all of the time. 
But the evidence in this case really was quite overwhelming. 
You had a third party who observed the things that happened when 
you both came out of that house. It was at complete odds with 
your testimony and her later testimony. It's consistent with what 
she told the officer at the scene. It's consistent with what the 
eleven year old told the officers at the scene. There is no 
corroboration for any of your testimony. 
(Tr., p.395, L.20 - p.396, L.18.) 
While Lay may find it significant that "the victim asked the district court not 
to sentence him to any term of incarceration" (Appellant's Brief, p.7), as noted by 
the district court, such a request is hardly surprising in a domestic violence 
situation. If anything, the victim's request and willingness to take the blame in 
this case following Lay's abuse and intimidation of her shows why she, and 
others, need protection from Lay. That Lay can successfully exercise power and 
2 State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982) 
(articulating the following "four objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection 
of society, (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally, (3) possibility 
of rehabilitation, and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing"). 
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control over an intimate partner is a factor weighing against probation, not in 
favor of it, especially given what the court characterized as his "extreme anger 
issues," which are consistent with the domestic evaluator's finding that he has 
"antisocial personality disorder." (Tr., p.396, Ls.21-25.) 
In addition to his reliance on the victim's request, Lay cites his drug 
addiction, his acknowledgement that he has performed poorly on probation and 
parole in the past, his "insight," alleged amenability to treatment, and the support 
of family and friends as other "mitigating factors" demonstrating an abuse of the 
court's discretion in denying his request for probation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.) 
Contrary to Lay's claims, the record fully supports the district court's sentence of 
imprisonment without probation. 
The district court explained why probation was not an option: 
I would find if I were to place you on probation, there's an undue 
risk that during any period of probation you would commit 
additional crimes that may very well involve violence. And more 
importantly you are a multiple offender, and, quite frankly, 1994 or 
'93, since 1993 you have been involved in the criminal justice 
system. So you are a multiple offender. 
The statements you've made today are, as [the prosecutor] 
pointed out, eerily similar to those that have been made in the past. 
You have never had a successful probation or parole. 
(Tr., p.398, L.16 - p.399, L.2.) 
Lay's claim that the district court should have placed him on probation 
despite the fact that he is a persistent violator who has "never had a successful 
probation or parole" is without merit. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgments in both 
cases. 
DATED this 20th day of June 2013. 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20th day of June 2013, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
SPENCER J. HAHN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the 
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
JML/pm 
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